Ranciere - Thinking between Disciplines - An Aesthetics of Knowledge, Ranciere
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PARRHESIA
NUMBER 1 • 2006 • 1 – 12
Thinking between disciplines: an aesthetics of knowledge
1
Jacques Rancière
Translated by Jon Roffe
What should be understood by the invocation of an ‘aesthetics of knowledge’? It is
clearly not a matter of saying that the forms of knowledge
must
take on an aesthetic
dimension. The expression presupposes that such a dimension does not have to be added
as a supplementary ornament, that it is there in every sense as an immanent given of
knowledge. It remains to be seen what this implies. The thesis that I would like to present
is simple: to speak of an aesthetic dimension of knowledge is to speak of a dimension of
ignorance which divides the idea and the practise of knowledge themselves.
This proposition evidently implies a presupposition concerning the meaning of
‘aesthetics’. The thesis is the following: aesthetics is not the theory of the beautiful or of
art; nor is it
the theory of sensibility. Aesthetics is an historically determined concept
which designates a specific regime of visibility and intelligibility of art, which is
inscribed in a reconfiguration of the categories of sensible experience and its
interpretation. It is the new type of experience that Kant systematised in the
Critique of
Judgement
. For Kant, aesthetic experience implies a certain disconnection from the
habitual conditions of sensible experience. This is what he summarises as a double
negation. The object of aesthetic apprehension is characterised as that which is neither an
object of knowledge nor an object of desire. Aesthetic appreciation of a form is without
concept. An artist does not give form to a given matter according to a function of
knowledge [
savoir
].
The reasons of the beautiful are thus separate from those of art. They are also separate,
though, from the reasons which render an object desirable or offensive. Now, this double
THINKING BETWEEN DISCIPLIINES
negation is not only defined by the new conditions of appreciation of art works. It also
defines a certain suspension of the normal conditions of social experience. This is what
Kant illustrates at the beginning of the
Critique of Judgement
with the example of the
palace, in which aesthetic judgement isolates the form alone, disinterested in knowing
[
savoir
] whether the palace serves the vanity of the idle rich and for which the sweat of
working people
has been spent in order to build it. This, Kant says, must be
ignored
to
aesthetically appreciate the form of the palace.
This will to ignorance declared by Kant has not ceased to provoke scandal. Pierre
Bourdieu has consecrated six hundred pages to the demonstration of a single thesis: that
this ignorance is a deliberate misrecognition [
méconnaissance
] of what the science of
sociology teaches us more and more precisely, to grasp the fact that disinterested
aesthetic judgement is the privilege of those alone who can abstract themselves – or who
believe that they can – from the sociological law which accords to each class of society
the judgements of taste corresponding to their
ethos
, that is, to the manner of being and of
feeling that its condition imposes upon it. The disinterested judgement on the formal
beauty of the palace is in fact reserved for those who are neither the owners of the palace
nor its builders. It is the judgement of the petit-bourgeois intellectual who, free from
worries about work or capital, indulges himself by adopting the position of universal
thought and disinterested taste.
2
Their exception therefore confirms the rule according to
which judgements of taste are in fact incorporated social judgements which translate a
socially determined ethos.
Bourdieu’s judgement, and that of all those who denounce the aesthetic illusion, rests on
a simple alternative: you know or you do not [
on connaît ou on méconnaît
]. If you do not
know [
méconnaît
], it is because you do not know [
sait
] how to look or you cannot look.
But to not be able to look is still a way of not knowing how to look. Whether philosopher
or petit-bourgeois, those who deny this, those who believe in the disinterested character
of aesthetic judgement do not want to see because they cannot see, because the place that
they occupy in the determined system, for them as for everyone else, constitutes a mode
of accommodation which determines a form of misrecognition [
méconnaissance
]. In
2
JACQUES RANCIERE
short, the aesthetic illusion confirms that subjects are subjected to a system because they
do not understand how it works. And if they do not understand, it is because the very
functioning of the system is misrecognition. The savant is the one who understands this
identity of systemic reasons and the reasons for its misrecognition.
This configuration of knowledge rests on a simple alternative: there is a true knowledge
[
savoir
] which is aware and a false knowledge [
savoir
] which ignores. False knowledge
oppresses, true knowledge liberates. Now the aesthetic neutralisation of knowledge
[
savoir
] suggests that this schema is too simple. It suggests that there is not one
knowledge but two, that each knowledge [
savoir
] is accompanied by a certain ignorance,
and therefore that there is also a knowledge [
savoir
] which represses and an ignorance
which liberates. If builders are oppressed, it is not because they ignore their exploitation
put in the service of the inhabitants of the palace. On the contrary, it is because they
cannot ignore it, because their condition imposes on them the need to create another body
and another way of seeing than that which oppresses them, because what is oppressive
prevents them from seeing in the palace something other than the product of the labour
invested and the idleness appropriated from this labour. In other words, a “knowledge”
[
savoir
] is always double: it is an ensemble of knowledges [
connaissances
] and it is also
an organised distribution [
partage
]
3
of positions. The builder is thus supposed to possess
a double knowledge [
savoir
]: a knowledge relative to their technical comportment and a
knowledge of the latter’s conditions.
Now, each of those knowledges has a particular
ignorance as its reverse: they who know how to work with their hands are supposed
ignorant with regard to appreciating the adequation of their work to a superior end. This
is why they know that they must continue to play their part. But to say that they “know”
[
sait
] this is in fact to say that it is not they who know what the system of roles must be.
Plato has explained this once and for all. Artisans cannot be occupied with the common
matters of the city for two reasons: firstly because work does not wait; secondly, because
god has put iron in the souls of artisans as he has put gold in the souls of those who must
run the city. In other words, their occupation defines aptitudes (and ineptitudes), and their
aptitudes in return commit them to a certain occupation. It is not necessary for artisans to
3
THINKING BETWEEN DISCIPLIINES
be convinced in the depths of their being that God has truly put iron in their souls, or gold
in those of their rulers. It is enough for them to act on an everyday basis as though this
was the case: it is enough that their arms, their gaze and their judgement make their
know-how [
savoir-faire
] and the knowledge of their condition accord with each other,
and vice versa. There is no illusion here, nor any misrecognition. It is, as Plato says, a
matter of ‘belief’. But belief is not illusion to be opposed to knowledge and which would
hide reality. It is a determined rapport of the two ‘knowledges’ and the two ‘ignorances’
which correspond to them.
It is this arrangement [
dispositif
]
that aesthetic experience deregulates. It is thus that such
experience is much more than a way of appreciating works of art. It concerns the
definition of a type of experience which neutralises the circular relationship between
knowledge [
connaissance
] as know-how [
savoir
] and knowledge as the distribution of
roles. Aesthetic experience eludes the sensible distribution of roles and competences
which structures the hierarchical order. The sociologist would like this to be nothing
more than the illusion of the philosopher, who believes in the disinterested universality of
judgements concerning the beautiful, since it ignores the conditions which determine the
tastes and the manner of being of the worker. But here the builders believe Plato rather
than the sociologist: what they need, and what aesthetic experience signifies, is a change
in the regime of belief, the change of the rapport between what the arms know how to do
and what the eyes are capable of seeing.
This is what we read, fifty years after Kant, in the journal of a worker in the time of the
1848 Revolution, a builder who claims to recount his working day but seems much rather
to be writing a personal paraphrase of the
Critique of Judgement
. To cite an extract of his
text:
Believing himself at home, he loves the arrangement of a room so
long as he has not finished laying the floor. If the window opens out
onto a garden or commands a view of a picturesque horizon, he
stops his arms a moment and glides in imagination towards the
4
JACQUES RANCIERE
spacious view to enjoy it better than he possessors of the
neighbouring residences.
4
Ignoring the fact that the house belongs to others, and acting
as if
what was being
enjoyed by the gaze also belonged to him – this is an operation of an effective disjunction
between the arms and the gaze, a disjunction between an
occupation
and the
aptitudes
which correspond to it. This is to exchange one
as if
for another
as if
. Plato told
stories
[
histoires
],
myths
, in order to submit technical knowledges to a knowledge of ‘ends’. This
knowledge of ends is necessary to found a hierarchical order. Unfortunately, this
supplement which provides foundation for the distribution of knowledges [
savoirs
] and
positions is without demonstrable foundation itself. It must be presupposed, and in order
to do so a story needs to be recounted which must be ‘believed’, in the sense defined
above.
Knowledge, Plato says, requires stories because it is in fact always double. However, he
aims to comprehend these stories within an ethical framework. ‘Ethics’, like aesthetics, is
a word whose meaning must be specified. We easily identify it with the moment in which
particular facts are judged according to universal values. But this is not the foremost
meaning of
ethos
. Before recalling law, morality or value,
ethos
indicates the abode
[
séjour
]. Further, it indicates the way of being which corresponds to this abode, the way
of feeling and thinking which belongs to whoever occupies any given place. It is in fact
this which is at issue in the Platonic myths. Plato recounts stories which prescribe the
way in which those who belong to a condition must live it. That is, he inscribes ‘poetic’
productions within a framework such that they are lessons, where the poet is a teacher of
the people, good or bad. This is to say that for Plato, there is no ‘aesthetics’.
Aesthetics means, in effect, a ‘finality without end’ [
finalité sans fin
], a pleasure
disconnected from every science of ends. It is a change in the status of the
as if
. The
aesthetic gaze which sees the form of the palace is without relation with its functional
perfection, and with its inscription in an order of society. It acts as if the gaze could be
detached from the double rapport of the palace with the knowledge [
savoir
] invested in
5
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